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CAUSATION, STATISTICS, AND THE LAW
Richard Scheines*
INTRODUCTION
More and more, judges and juries are being asked to handle
torts and other cases in which establishing liability involves
understanding large bodies of complex scientific evidence. When
establishing causation is involved, the evidence can be diverse, can
involve complicated statistical models, and can seem impenetrable
to non-experts. Since the decision in Daubert v. Merril Dow
Pharms., Inc.1 in 1993, judges cannot simply admit expert
testimony and other technical evidence and let jurors decide the
verdict. Judges now must rule on which experts are admissible and
which are inadmissible, and they must base their ruling at least
partly on the status of the scientific evidence about which the
expert will testify. 2 This article is intended to provide judges with
an accessible methodological overview of causal science.
Part I of this article will explain the nature of causal claims in
the realm of judicial evidence. Part II will address why these claims
are difficult to prove scientifically and identify the different kinds
of evidence typically used to prove causal claims. Part III will
explain how the discipline of statistics fits into the science of
establishing causal claims. Finally, part IV will summarize the
necessary steps to take when evaluating a causation argument. As

* Dr. Scheines is a Professor (and Head) of Philosophy at Carnegie Mellon
University, with courtesy appointments in the Department of Machine Learning
and the Human-Computer Interaction Institute.
1
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2
Id. at 592–93.
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these statistical arguments can seem quite complicated, the article
will focus particularly on making them simple and intelligible.3 In
order to make matters concrete, two examples will be used: 1) a
hypothetical toxic tort involving liver cancer and QualChem 43;4
and 2) another hypothetical involving exposure to lead and tested
IQ in children.
I. T HE N ATURE OF CAUSAL CLAIMS
Two questions were posed within the hypothetical examples as
a means of illustrating the various points of this article: 1) Was
John Smith’s liver cancer caused by his exposure to QualChem 43
and 2) Was the lower than average level of tested IQ scores among
economically disadvantaged Boston area elementary school children
a result of their exposure to lead from old paint and pipes.
First, we must distinguish between individual and general
causal claims.5 An individual claim involves a particular person or
event and asserts that it was caused by another particular event or
condition, e.g., John Smith’s liver cancer was caused by his
exposure to QualChem 43 in the water he drank. A general causal
claim refers to a population of individuals, and concerns the
probability or average severity of a property (e.g., a disease) in that
population.6 For example, in the lead and IQ claim, the population
is economically disadvantaged Boston area elementary school
children, the property is tested IQ, and the claim is that the average

3

The perspective I offer here is developed much more fully in an interactive
textbook called Empirical Research Methods with Regression, by Steve Klepper
and Richard Scheines, available online at http://www.cmu.edu/oli/, Empirical
Research Methods, Open Learning Initiative, http://www.cmu.edu/oli/courses/
enter_erm.html.
4
See “Toxic Tort Hypothetical,” attached at the end of this article.
5
See COMM. ON EVALUATION OF THE PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR VETERANS, INST. OF MED., IMPROVING THE
PRESUMPTIVE D ISABILITY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR VETERANS 7-1
(Jonathan M. Samet & Catherine C. Bodurow, eds., 2007) [hereinafter
PRESUMPTIVE D ISABILITY]; PETER SPIRTES ET AL., CAUSATION , PREDICTION ,
AND S EARCH (2d ed. 2000).
6
PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY , supra note 5.
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level of the property is different than it would have been had the
population not been exposed to lead. The general claim does not
entail that every child in the population who was exposed to lead
lost IQ points, nor does it claim that every child with a lower than
average tested IQ was so because of exposure to lead. It is a claim
about the average IQ in the population, and how that might have
differed if the children had not been exposed to lead from old paint
and old pipes.
In both cases the essential claim is counterfactual: the effect
would have been different if the cause had been different.7 For
John Smith, the claim is: had John Smith not been exposed to
QualChem 43, he would not have gotten liver cancer. For lead and
IQ, the claim is: had the population of Boston children not been
exposed to lead from old paint and pipes, their average IQ would
have been higher.
In both cases the counterfactual supposition is a bit vague.
How are we to imagine John Smith’s life without QualChem 43?
Do we imagine he avoided exposure to QualChem 43 by having
lived in a different location? By having been wealthy and only
consuming bottled water? How are we to imagine the Boston
children’s life without lead? Are they allowed to relocate to
Phoenix, Arizona, where much of the infrastructure is so new that
lead doesn’t occur in paint and pipes? No. What we mean to
suppose, in both cases, is that everything was as close to the way
it actually happened as possible, except for removing the “cause.”
For John Smith we imagine that he lived exactly the same life, but
that his drinking water contained no QualChem 43. For the Boston
children, we imagine that they lived exactly the same life, that their
paint was identical in appearance but contained no lead, and that
their pipes contained no lead but were otherwise indistinguishable.8
7

For more information about a counterfactual, and how it relates to
causation, see generally CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS (John D. Collins,
Ned Hall & L. A. Paul, eds., 2004).
8
In these cases it is reasonably straightforward to imagine the counterfactual
world that grounds the causal claim, whereas in others it’s not. For example,
suppose we claim that Jane Doe was the victim of sex discrimination. Had she
been male, she would have received a higher salary. Imagining a world in which
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We do not imagine John Smith as wealthy enough to purchase
bottled water because had John Smith been affluent, he may have
avoided liver cancer due to better access to health care, a more
nutritious diet, and the other positive health benefits associated
with higher socio-economic status. We need to imagine a
circumstance in which the only difference between the actual world
and the hypothetical world is the presence or absence of the
purported “cause.”
This counterfactual perspective, made famous by Donald
Rubin (1974),9 makes it clear why causal claims are so hard to
establish scientifically. We cannot go back in time and watch John
Smith re-live his life without QualChem 43, nor can we go back in
time and remove lead from the environment of the Boston children
and then re-test their IQs. Our only realistic option is to find a
feasible real-world surrogate for the inaccessible counterfactual
world.
In the individual case, such as that of John Smith, this strategy
is practically hopeless. We cannot seriously hope to find another
individual sufficiently close in makeup and circumstance to John
Smith, save being exposed to QualChem 43. Even if Smith was
born with an identical twin who was not exposed to QualChem 43,
the circumstances of the twin’s life are almost certainly different
from John Smith’s living conditions to the extent that a comparison
would be practically meaningless. Even worse, if exposure to a
chemical does not determine a disease, but only changes one’s
chances of getting it, then comparing a single alternative is not
much help.
The situation for general causal claims is better but nonetheless
challenging. Consider the following figure.

everything was the same as the actual world, except for Jane Doe’s sex, is not at
all straightforward. See David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. OF PHIL . 556, 557–58
(1973).
9
Donald Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized
and Nonrandomized Studies, 66 J. OF EDUC. PSYCH . 632, 688–701 (1974).
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Actual Population 1:
Average(IQ) = X
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Actual Population 2:
No lead exposure
observed
Average(IQ) = ??

Causation
Counterfactual
Population 1:
Changed to eliminate lead
Average(IQ) = ??

Figure 1: Counterfactual vs. Actual Populations
Suppose that the box in the upper left of Figure 1 (Actual
Population 1) represents the actual population of Boston school
children we are considering. The box below it (Counterfactual
Population 1) represents a counterfactual world we cannot access:
a world involving the same children living the same life, save that
we have gone back in time and intervened to remove the lead from
the paint and the pipes but otherwise left things alone. The box in
the upper right (Actual Population 2) represents what we can
obtainanother group of actual children that are not exposed to
lead. For example, we might consider children from Phoenix,
Arizona that are otherwise as similar as possible to the Boston
children in our original population. The problem, of course, is that
such a group will inevitably differ in lots of ways, many of which
might well be relevant to their tested IQ.
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II. T HE KINDS OF EVIDENCE FOR CAUSAL C LAIMS
There are three kinds of evidence typically used in scientifically
establishing general level causal claims: clinical trials, observational
studies, and biological/toxicological studies.10
A. Clinical Trials
Sir Ronald Fisher, the brilliant and prolific British statistician,
provided in the 1930s what is still the gold standard today for
causal inference: the randomized trial (“RT”).11 In its simplest
form, an RT randomly splits a population into two subgroups,
thus creating two “versions” of the same population,12 and then
exposes one sub-population to the cause (the “treated” group) and
does not expose one to the cause (the “control” group). The
frequency of the effect in the two groups provides evidence of the
probability of the effect in the two populations we seek: one in
which the cause is present, and an identical copy in which the
cause is not present. Subtleties abound, but the basic strategy is
sound and taught in every introductory research methods course.
The problem, of course, is that performing an RT is either
ethically or practically impossible in a number of situations. We
simply cannot intentionally expose half a population of children to
lead or QualChem 43. There are essentially two recourses to an
RT: 1) we can conduct an observational study and statistically
adjust for naturally occurring differences in two populations, or 2)
10

For a much more detailed discussion, see PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY ,
supra note 5 at 117–38; CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION , D EP’ T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN S VCS, 2004 S URGEON GENERAL’S REPORT—T HE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING (2004); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000).
11
RONALD A. F ISHER, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH W ORKERS
(4th ed., Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd 1932) (1925).
12
They are not literally the same, of course. Because they were formed by
randomly assigning individuals to one subgroup or the other, we can expect
both groups to share the same statistically measurable qualities (e.g., same
percentage of smokers and non-smokers, same percentage of lower, middle, and
upper class people, etc.). Thus, when viewed as whole groups, they are
statistically identical.
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we can perform very small versions of RTs on animals we deem
appropriate for testing despite the inflicted harm, e.g., rodents.
B. Observational Studies
Observational studies involve human populations in which we
do not control exposure to a cause.13 Thus, we are typically
comparing an actual subpopulation whose members were exposed
to a cause and another subpopulation whose members were not
exposed, e.g., Actual Population 1 as compared to Actual
Population 2 in Figure 1. For example, in examining whether
poverty causes crime, sociologists might collect data on a
subpopulation of people below the poverty line and compare them
to a subpopulation of people above the poverty line. The study is
“observational” if the sociologist does not intervene to affect
whether any of the subjects were above or below poverty.
In some cases, the “cause” is not a simple on-off event like
“below the poverty line” versus “above the poverty line,” but
rather, the cause is a factor that can take on values across a large
range, e.g., yearly income in dollars. For example, another
sociologist might sample a population and measure each
individual’s level of income according to dollars earned per year and
their criminal activity according to the number of days spent in jail.
An observational study that involves health or disease is called
an “epidemiological study.”14 A classic example is a “cohort” study
in which groups which vary by exposure are tracked over time and
compared as to some health outcome like cancer. For example,
Takeshi Hirayama (1984)15 tracked lung cancer mortality for over
16 years in over 90,000 non-smoking wives in Japan, some of

13

PAUL R. R OSENBAUM, OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES 2 (2d ed. 2002).
KENNETH J. ROTHMAN & SANDER GREENLAND , MODERN
EPIDEMIOLOGY (3d ed. 1998).
15
Takeshi Hirayama, Cancer Mortality in Nonsmoking Women With
Smoking Husbands Based on a Large-Scale Sohort Study in Japan, 13
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 680, 680–90 (1984).
14
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whom were married to non-smokers, some to moderate smokers,
some to heavy smokers.
Another type of epidemiological study is a “case-control”
study: instead of comparing the frequency of an effect in two
subpopulations that vary as to the cause, epidemiologists compare
the level of exposure to the cause in two subpopulations that differ
on the effect. For example, in the toxic tort hypothetical involving
QualChem 43, epidemiologists employed by the Mississippi
Department of Public Health compared the rate of exposure to
QualChem 43 between a group of liver cancer patients and a group
of similar patients without liver cancer.
The essential methodological issue in observational studies is
that populations that vary in level of exposure to the cause might
vary in other ways that are relevant to the effect. This is generally
called the problem of “confounding” and how scientists address
this problem will be discussed later in the section on statistics.
C. Biological/Toxicological Studies
In many cases, animals like rats, mice, rabbits, or chimps seem
to have physiological pathways or components sufficiently similar
to our own that we believe we can extrapolate from what happens
in experiments with animals to what would happen in similar
experiments with humans. Biologists frequently perform controlled
experiments on rodents to garner evidence for whether some
chemical causes cancer. They expose some rodents to a “control”
and others that are genetically identical and raised in the same
environment to the chemical of interest, and then biologists
compare the frequency of cancerous tumors. For example, in the
hypothetical toxic tort involving QualChem 43, rats were used in a
study to examine the toxicology of QualChem 43 with respect to
liver cancer.
The degree to which such studies are relevant to the causal
claim in humans depends upon 1) whether the physiological
mechanism by which the chemical produces the disease in the
experimental animals is similar to the mechanism that would
produce the disease in humans, and 2) whether we can translate
animal doses to human doses in terms of equivalent toxicity. For
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example, in the toxicological study on rats in the toxic tort
hypothetical, “researchers believe that both liver and kidney cancer
are initiated by perturbations in cell differentiation,” and therefore
they believe that the mechanisms are similar enough in humans to
make the animal results relevant. In terms of the dosage, the
researchers responsible for the study believe that they can roughly
translate the dosage given to each group of rats into human units,
and in this case, the number of lifetime equivalent doses to which
John Smith was exposed. Thus the first group of rats was exposed
to the equivalent of twice the dose of QualChem 43 that John
Smith received in his lifetime.
III. STATISTICS AND C AUSATION
Studies reported in peer reviewed scientific journals can seem
filled with statistical tables and jargon. This section will identify
what is essential about what the statistics indicate while also
explaining what is not essential and why.
The scientific case for causation is usually made in two stages.
First, we make the prima facie case that there is a statistical
association between the purported cause and the effect. As several
different causal arrangements can produce statistical association,
however, association by itself does not prove causation. In the
second stage of making a scientific case for causation, we attempt
to eliminate all other possible explanations of this association. In
both stages, statistical methods are involved.
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A. Making a Prima Facie Case for Causation: Establishing an
Association
Observed Association
Actual Population 1:
Prob(Effect | Exposed to Cause)

Actual Population 2:
Prob(Effect | Not Exposed to Cause)

Causal
Association
Counterfactual Population 1:

Prob(Effect | Cause removed )

Figure 2: Causation vs. Association16
Consider Figure 2, which is a slightly revised version of Figure
1. To establish causation, we need to show that the effect is more
probable among those exposed to the cause than it would have been
among the same group, had they not been exposed to the cause. In
Figure 2, this translates into comparing the two columns in Table 1:
Actual Population 1

Counterfactual Population 1

Prob(Effect | Exposed to Cause)

Prob(Effect | Cause removed)

Table 1: Causal Association
The difference in these probabilities is the causal effect, and it is
the Holy Grail of Causal Science.17 There are two major scientific
challenges to getting there:

16

The expression Prob(Effect | Exposed to Cause) denotes the probability
of the effect among those Exposed to the Cause. It also might be referred to as
the conditional probability of the Effect, given Exposure to the Cause. In the
Counterfactual Population 1, the notation Prob(Effect | Cause removed) shows
“removed” in italics to emphasize that we are intervening to remove the cause.
17
SPIRTES ET AL ., supra note 5; Rubin, supra note 9, at 688–701.
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1. Counterfactual populations are unobservable: because
we cannot go back in time and remove the cause from the
actual exposed population, we are forced to compare two
distinct actual populations.
2. Probabilities are unobservable: we can only study a
finite sample of individuals and then make a statistical
inference about the probabilities from the observed
frequencies in the sample.
Let us focus first on the second problem, in which the use of
statistics is, if not simple, fairly straightforward. If we can do a
randomized trial, then we can compare two groups that we expect
to be identical, and thus overcome the first obstacle. That is, in an
RT we assume the difference in Table 2 will correspond to the
difference in Table 1.
Actual Population 1
Prob(Effect | Assigned to:
Exposed to the Cause)

Actual Population 2
Prob(Effect | Assigned to:
Not Exposed to the Cause)

Table 2: Association in a Randomized Trial
Although the challenge of unobservable probabilities must still
be overcome in a RT, the discipline of statistics provides us with a
rigorous theory of how to do so. For example, consider a fictitious
(and unethical) study involving QualChem 43 and liver cancer
involving a sample of 100 people, half of whom were chosen at
random and intentionally exposed to Qualchem 43 and the other
half intentionally not exposed. In this example, and several that
follow, the true causal process was simulated on a computer, and
samples were pseudo-randomly drawn from the population that
the computer model defined. Thus, in each case, when reference is
made to the “true” model, such reference is to the computer
simulation rather than the real world.
Figure 3 shows hypothetical frequencies of liver cancer 20
years later in both the exposed and unexposed groups. The left side
of the figure shows a bar chart for the group exposed to QualChem
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43, about 20% of whom contracted liver cancer, and the right side
shows a bar chart for the unexposed group, about 3% of whom
developed liver cancer. The difference in the charts reflects the
statistical association between liver cancer and QualChem 43, and
the association appears to be substantial.

Figure 3: QualChem 43 Trial
Calling the “difference” in the charts an “association” is a little
vague without defining what constitutes an association. To discuss
the notion of association scientifically, we must have a clear and
precise measure of association. We can then estimate the
association from data and assess the range of our uncertainty
around this estimate. The following section presents three
measures of association that are commonly employed: Relative
Risk, Odds Ratio, and Correlation.
1. Relative Risk
The most common measure of association in disease and
exposure studies is called the relative risk, or RR. The relative risk
is defined as:
RR =

# exposed with disease # exposed
incidence(exposed)
=
incidence(unexposed) # not exposed with disease # not exposed
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In Figure 3, the relative risk for liver cancer of QualChem 43 is
.202 / .032 = 6.31. A relative risk of 1.0 reflects that the frequency
of disease among the exposed is the same as among the unexposed,
thereby indicating that there is zero association. A relative risk of
10 means that the rate of disease among the exposed is ten times as
high as among the unexposed.
A high relative risk does not imply a high absolute risk in the
population. If, for example, one in a million unexposed individuals
gets the disease but 10 in a million exposed individuals get the
disease, then the relative risk is 10, even though the chances of
getting the disease among those exposed is still only 1 in 100,000.
Another measure of association that is commonly used in casecontrol studies like the one described in the toxic tort hypothetical
discussed later is the odds ratio, or OR:
OR =

# with disease & exposed # without disease & exposed
# with disease & not exposed # without disease & not exposed

No matter which measure of association one uses, however, the
key statistical question is whether from the observed association
we can infer that there is a real (population) association.
2. Hypothesis Tests and P-values
The most common statistical method with which to make this
inference is called a hypothesis test, particularly the “null”
hypothesis that the real association is zero and the observed
association was due to random chance.18 The first example cited in
nearly every textbook is a fair coin, which we can assume has a
probability of landing heads of 50%. If we flip a new coin 1,000
times and observe 590 heads and 410 tails, for example, we might
question whether it was really fair. One way to answer this
question is to compute how likely it is that in 1,000 trials we
would see a deviation from 500-500 of 90 (or more) if the coin is
really fair. If this is highly unlikely, then we reject the “null”
18

FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH (2d ed. 2000).
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hypothesis, and we conclude that the new coin is not fair. In
making the prima facie case in causal science, the null hypothesis is
that there is zero association between the cause and effect. Under
this assumption, we compute the likelihood that the non-zero
association we observed is purely due to random chance in the
sample we drew. If it is highly unlikely to have observed an
association of such magnitude, then we can conclude the
association is indeed significant.
For example, consider another fictitious study in which we
examine whether QualChem 57, a chemical similar to QualChem 43,
causes liver cancer. Suppose in this study, involving only 50
subjects, we observe frequencies (Figure 4) that appear to indicate
almost exactly the same level of association that was seen in Figure
3 for QualChem 43.
In Figure 4, the percentage of liver cancer is 19% among those
intentionally exposed to QualChem 57 and nearly 4% among the
group not exposed, thereby producing a Relative Risk of 4.8. On
one hand, the study may show that QualChem 57 causes liver
cancer, however, on the other hand, the chemical may have no
effect if the observed association is due to random chance. For
example, the probability that we would see an association as big as
the one in Figure 4 from random chance, even if there was zero
association in the population from which we sampled is 0.21. This
number is called a p-value. The p-value tells us that if QualChem
57 and liver cancer had no association in reality, but we
nevertheless repeated the same experiment ad infinitum, then we
would still expect to observe as large an association as the one in
Figure 4 over 20% of the time. Since the observed association in
Figure 4 could so easily be explained by random chance, it is said to
be statistically insignificant. In the computer simulation for
QualChem 57 and liver cancer, QualChem 57 had no effect on liver
cancer, there was no association whatsoever in the underlying
model (RR = 1.0), and the observed RR = 4.8 was entirely due to
random sampling variation.
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Figure 4: QualChem 57 Trial
Associations reported in studies are not typically considered
statistically significant unless the chances of seeing that large an
association just from random chance are less than .05, or one in
twenty. This is a completely arbitrary convention, and can be quite
misleading when interpreted as a strict threshold, or decision rule.
In Figure 3, for example, the association (RR= 6.31) in the sample
has a p-value = .058 which would be considered statistically
insignificant at a threshold of .05 even though the Relative Risk in
the underlying model simulated in the computer was 4.4
(probabilities equal to 22% for exposed and 5% for unexposed).
3.

Confidence Intervals

Confidence intervals are closely related to p-values and serve as
an attempt to capture the uncertainty in a parameter estimate that
is due to random chance, or “sampling variability.” For example, in
a political poll that reports the percentage of people who approve
of George Bush’s performance as President, the result might be
described as “accurate to within plus or minus three percentage
points.”19 Statistically speaking, this means if the survey was
repeated numerous times, each with the same number of subjects,
and each time we reported our findings as an interval that was
within three percentage points of the percentage that we observed,
19

See, e.g., PollingReport.Com, President Bush: Job Ratings, http://
www.pollingreport.com/BushJob1.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
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then 95% of the time our interval would contain the true
percentage. The 95% is the “confidence level,” and again, using
95% is a purely arbitrary convention.
With a bigger sample, the 95% confidence interval gets
narrower, and the results of the study become more precise. Many
political polls, for example, sample the opinions of just over 1,000
voters.20 With this sample size, a 95% confidence interval usually
amounts to plus or minus three percentage points. If the pollsters
interviewed 10,000 voters, then a 95% confidence interval would
be approximately plus or minus 1 percentage point.21
Adjusting the confidence level also changes the size of the
interval. If the political pollsters took a sample of 1,000, but
reported a 50% confidence interval instead of a 95% confidence
interval, the results would be accurate within slightly more than
one percentage point.
In the case of establishing an association to make a prima facie
case for causation, the parameter of interest is the size of the
association in the population. In Figure 3, for example, the sample
drawn from the population exhibits a relative risk of 6.31. Maybe
the real RR (the RR in the population, which we cannot observe) is
actually 6.29. Maybe the RR in the population is 1.0 (no
association). The 95% confidence interval around our estimated
RR=6.31 includes a RR of 1.0, and therefore, a population with no
association is within our 95% confidence interval. A 90% interval
would not include a RR of 1.0. Similarly, in the case-control study
in the toxic tort hypothetical, Exhibit C shows 90% and 95%
confidence intervals for the estimated odds-ratio of 3.2. As you can
see, the 90% interval is nested within the 95%, and the 95%
interval includes a RR of 1.0 while the 90% interval does not
include the same RR. A 100% interval would have to include all
possible levels of association.
The relationship between p-values and confidence intervals is
simple. Whatever the observed level of association A, if an X%

20

See, e.g., id.
To see how the confidence level, confidence interval, and sample size
interact, see the Sample Size Calculator at www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm
(last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
21
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confidence interval around A meets exactly the number that
corresponds to zero association, then the observed level of
association A is significant at a p-value of X%.
X% Confidence Interval

Zero
Association

A
(Observed Association)

Figure 5: Confidence level = p-value
For example, in the case-control study in the toxic tort
hypothetical, a 94% confidence interval would meet exactly zero,
therefore the association is significant at a p-value of .06.
4.

Correlation

These points apply equally well in cases in which we are
examining a dose-response relationship between quantities that
vary across a numerical range, such as exposure to lead and IQ. In
that case, the measure of association typically used is the
correlation coefficient. The p-value and confidence interval have the
same logic for correlation as they do for relative risk, odds ratio, or
any other statistical measure of association. For example, in a
fictitious experiment (again, simulated in a computer) in which a
sample of 160 children were exposed to a random amount of lead
for the first seven years of life and then given an IQ test on their
seventh birthday, we might observe the scatter-plot of doseresponse shown in Figure 6. The blue line represents the bestfitting line (regression line) in which IQ is predicted from lead
exposure. The correlation coefficient of -.211 is a measure of
association in this type of sample. The p-value of .007 indicates
that the probability of observing this large a negative correlation
from just random chance is .007. Since .007 is very low, and well
below .05 or the other common cutoff .01, the correlation would be
considered significant.
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Figure 6: Lead and IQ Scatterplot
In these three fictitious cases, we came close to making a prima
facie case for the hypothesis that QualChem 43 causes liver cancer
(p-value = .058, Figure 3), we failed to make a prima facie case for
the hypothesis that QualChem 57 causes liver cancer (p-value =
.21, Figure 4), and we easily made a prima facie case for the
hypothesis that lead causes IQ deficits in 7 year olds (p-value =
.007, Figure 6).
To summarize, getting to the Holy Grail of Causal Science
requires overcoming two obstacles: comparing the right actual
populations and making statistical inferences. No matter which
populations we compare, to make a prima facie case for causation
requires the statistical inference that there is association between
the putative cause and the effect. P-values and confidence intervals
help us get over the “is there really an association” obstacle.
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B. Challenges to the Prima Facie Case
Supposing that we have passed the prima facie test for
causation, what more remains in order to establish (and estimate
the strength of) a causal relationship? In the case of a randomized
trial, nothing. That is because a randomized trial overcomes the
first obstacle to establishing causationcomparing the right
populations.
In an observational study, however, we cannot assume that a
group that was exposed to the cause and another group that was
not exposed are otherwise the same. For example, suppose we
compare two groups in an observational study: one group that was
exposed to QualChem 43 and one group that was unexposed to the
chemical. Suppose the first group of 200 lived on the Blue River in
Mississippi, where they were exposed to QualChem 43 from the
release of the chemical into the Blue River near their houses.
Suppose the second group of 200 lived on the Red River in Kansas.
Suppose that the relative risk of liver cancer between the two
groups was 2.3, which was significant at a p-value = .003 and thus
passed the prima facie test with flying colors. Statistically, it is true
to say that the chance of observing an RR of 2.3, if there is none in
the population, is less than 3 in 1,000. Therefore, let us agree that
there is an association between QualChem 43 exposure and liver
cancer.
Suppose, however, that the socioeconomic status (“SES”) of
the Red River families was on average much higher than the Blue
River families. As a result of their lower SES, the Blue River
families are less able to afford to live away from industry and thus
more prone to QualChem 43 exposure. Further, as a result of lower
SES, Blue River families also tend to consume a more unhealthy
diet and more alcohol, both of which cause liver cancer (Figure 7).
The different average SES in the two groups is called a
“confounder,” as it is an alternative, non-causal explanation of the
association between QualChem 43 exposure and liver cancer.
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Low SES

Can’t Afford
Housing far from
Industry

Exposure to
QualChem 43

High Alcohol
Consumption
Poor
Diet

Liver Cancer

Figure 7: Confounding
The big problem is that the size of the observed association has
no logical relation to whether it came from confounding or
causation.
For example, Figure 8 shows the results of a simulation in
which QualChem 43 causes liver cancer, but the casual relationship
between the chemical and cancer is weak (RR = 1.33). In the
sample of 200 drawn, the observed RR = 1.29 (p-value = 0.11), is
not significant at the usual level of .05 or even at the weaker
significance level of .10.
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Figure 8: Causation, RR= 1.29, p = .11
Figure 9 shows the results of a simulation in which QualChem
43 does NOT cause liver cancer, but is associated with the disease
(RR=2.4) as a result of the confounder SES. In the random sample
of 200 drawn in this simulation, the RR is 2.3 with a p-value well
under .01results which would pass muster as statistically
significant in any court of science or law.
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Figure 9: Confounding, RR = 2.3, p < .01
Unfortunately, we do not get to see the “correct graph” in the
real world; only the observed RR or some other measure of
association. From the above hypotheticals, it should be obvious
that association doesn’t prove causation. If the association appears
statistically real, that does not mean the association was produced
by a causal relationship, but rather, only that it was not produced
by random chance.
It is tempting to think that the statistical level of
certainty/uncertainty about an association should translate in some
way to a level of certainty/uncertainty about whether there is a
causal relationship. For example, if in study 1 the RR for chemical
A is significant at a p-value of .04, and in study 2 the RR for
chemical B is significant at a p-value of .00001, then it is tempting
to think that the case for causation is correspondingly stronger for
chemical B than it is for chemical A. However, confounding renders
this belief inaccurate.
If confounding is plausible, which is almost always the case in
an observational study, then the level of statistical uncertainty about

SCHEINES F INAL W ITH T OXIC TORT H YPOTHETIC AL ATTACHED 5. DOC

CAUSATION, STATISTICS, AND THE LAW

1/17/08 2:11 PM

157

the size of the association has almost nothing to do with the level of
uncertainty about the size of the causal effect.22 The lack of a
relationship between the statistical uncertainties of the association
and the size of the causal effect cannot be emphasized strongly
enough as it is easy to confuse statistical certainty about
association (low p-values, tight confidence intervals) with scientific
certainty about causation.
As if the worry about confounding wasn’t enough of a
challenge to the prima facie case for causation, there are other
reasons why an observed association might be spurious, that is,
explicable by some non-causal reason. In case control studies like
the one described in the hypothetical toxic tort, for example,
instead of comparing the frequency of the effect (e.g., liver cancer)
among two groups that differ on the cause, epidemiologists
compare the frequency of exposure to the cause among two groups
that differ on the effect (e.g., a group of liver cancer patients versus
a group of otherwise similar patients who do not have liver
cancer).23 If the frequency of exposure is different, then an
association exists between the cause and the effect.
A common source of spurious association in case-control
studies is “recall bias.”24 For example, consider Figure 10, which
shows a causal structure in which actual exposure to QualChem 43
has no effect on liver cancer, but in which recalled exposure and
liver cancer will be associated. This is quite plausible, as liver
cancer patients who are asked to recall whether they were exposed
to QualChem 43 might be suspicious that some industrial chemical

22

See James M. Robins, Confidence Intervals for Causal Parameters, 7
STATISTICS IN MEDICINE 773, 773–85 (1988); see also James M. Robins,
Richard Scheines, Peter Spirtes, & Larry Wasserman, Uniform Consistency in
Causal Inference, 90 B IOMETRIKA 491, 491–515 (2003).
23
ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 14.
24
ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 14.
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emitted by some uncaring chemical company caused their cancer,
while similar individuals who are otherwise healthy will have no
extra motivation to recall being exposed.
Actual Exposure to
QualChem43

Liver Cancer

Recalled
Exposure

Figure 10: Recall Bias

C. Overcoming Challenges to the Prima Facie Case
1. Statistically Adjusting for Confounding
If an epidemiologist were to compare the Red River group to
the Blue River group, they would be well aware that these groups
might differ in ways germane to the causal claim at issue. In
particular, epidemiologists would almost certainly entertain the
idea that the groups differed as to SES. As a result, they would
undoubtedly employ the most common strategy in dealing with
differences in two populations in an observational study:
epidemiologists would measure SES and adjust for the difference
statistically. 25 They would compute the association between
QualChem 43 and liver cancer that arises because of differences in
SES, and then report only the residual association between
QualChem 43 and liver cancer that could not be explained by SES.26
The researchers would then test whether this adjusted association
could be explained by random chance (natural sample variation).27
For example, Figure 9 shows a study in which the RR for
QualChem 43 and liver cancer is 2.3, which is a significant
association (p-value < .01). If, however, we adjust the association
25
26
27

ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 14.
ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 14.
ROTHMAN & GREENLAND, supra note 14.
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by controlling for SES, then the RR = 1.17 and is insignificant (pvalue = .83). Thus, in this case, QualChem 43 passed the prima
facie test but did not withstand challenges to the test.
When the measure of association used is correlation, then by far
the most commonly used statistical technique for adjusting for
confounders is multiple regression.28 Easy to interpret and use,
multiple regression computes the correlation between a putative
cause and effect adjusting for any number of “covariates”
(measured confounders).
When is the strategy of adjusting for confounders reliable for
overcoming challenges to the prima facie test? First, it is only
reliable if we have adjusted for all the differences in the two
populations that are potential causes of the effect, i.e. if we have
controlled for all the potential confounders. Just as our prima facie
case for QualChem 43 in the Figure 9 study came undone when we
adjusted for SES, another study that showed a significant
association after adjusting for SES might come undone when we
adjust not only for SES but also for age. Just as the p-value or
confidence interval for an unadjusted association between a
potential cause X and an effect Y tells us very little about the level
of our uncertainty as to whether X is a true cause of Y, the p-value
of an adjusted association tells us very little about the level of our
uncertainty as to whether X is a true cause of Y. Adjusting for
confounders is crucial, but unless we are confident we have
measured and adjusted for all the confounders, we cannot quite yet
reach for the Holy Grail of Causal Science.
The second major scientific problem in adjusting for
confounders is that they must be measured accurately. In many
cases, what we can measure is a very noisy approximation of the
real thing. For example, consider the case of lead and IQ. If we
made a prima facie case that exposure to lead was negatively
correlated with IQ, an immediate challenge to inferring causation is
the spurious association that might arise from parental resources
(Figure 11). Parents with higher levels of resources, financial and
28

See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 179–200 (2d ed. 2000).
.

SCHEINES F INAL W ITH T OXIC TORT H YPOTHETIC AL ATTACHED 5. DOC

160

1/17/08 2:11 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

otherwise, will avoid housing that might have lead contamination
from paint or pipes (or they will have it repaired), and they will
also typically provide more stimulation to their children, especially
the type that will result in higher tested IQ, entry into a good
school, good college, etc.
Parental Resources

Lead Exposure

??

Tested IQ

Figure 11: Confounder of Lead and IQ:
Parental Resources
Thus any study on the causal connection between lead and IQ
should report a correlation adjusted for the level of parental
resources. How are we to measure the level of parental resources?
Going into the home and extensively surveying and observing the
parents would be ideal but also impractical. Sociologists are more
likely to ask the mother how many years of education she has
completed.29 The number of years of education the mother has
completed is a good proxy of for parental resources, but an
imperfect one. Unfortunately, statistically adjusting for an
imperfect measure of a confounder is the same as partially omitting
the confounder altogether. The more imperfect the measure, the
more it is akin to omission.

29

See, e.g., J.L. Needleman, S. Geiger & R. Frank, Lead and IQ scores: a
reanalysis, 227 SCIENCE 701, 701–04 (1985).

SCHEINES F INAL W ITH T OXIC TORT H YPOTHETIC AL ATTACHED 5. DOC

1/17/08 2:11 PM

CAUSATION, STATISTICS, AND THE LAW
Parental Resources

161

PR Measure
Noise

Lead Exposure

Tested IQ

Figure 12: Confounder Measured Poorly
For example, consider a simulated example (Figure 12) in which
lead exposure has no effect on tested IQ. Thus any observed
correlation is spurious and due entirely to parental resources or to
random variation in sampling. Further, consider a measure of
imperfect parental resources (“PR Measure”): ½ of the variation in
the measure is from variation in parental resources, but ½ is from
unrelated noise. Table 3 shows, in a simulated sample (N=1,000),
the correlation between lead and IQ, the correlation adjusted for
parental resources, and the correlation adjusted for PR Measure.
Table 3: Unadjusted and Adjusted Correlations
Correlation
Unadjusted (ρlead,IQ )
Adjusted for Parental Resources
(ρlead,IQ.Parental_Resources)
Adjusted for PR Measure (ρlead,IQ.PR_Measure )

Value
-0.159
-0.052

p-value
<0.001**
0.125

-0.106

0.011**

Although the unadjusted correlation is only -.159, it is highly
significant statistically. When adjusted for the true confounder
(parental resources), the correlation is insignifant (p-value = .125).
Thus, the prima facie case passes but the case cannot withstand a
standard challenge. If, instead of adjusting for parental resources,
however, we used the imperfect PR measure, then the adjusted
correlation appears significant at .011. Such a correlation is
sufficient for any court of law or science, but because we have
adjusted on an imperfect measure, we have produced a biased
estimate of the adjusted association.
Again, just as the p-value or confidence interval for an
unadjusted association between a potential cause X and an effect Y
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tells us very little about the level of our uncertainty as to whether
X is a true cause of Y, the p-value of an adjusted association tells
us very little about the level of our scientific uncertainty as to
whether X is a true cause of Y, especially in cases in which the
confounders are measured poorly.
In cases in which most of the observed association is due to
confounding, for example, it doesn’t take much measurement error
to produce a spurious adjusted association. In the case of lead and
its effect on IQ, for example, we would expect most of the
observed negative correlation between lead exposure and IQ to arise
not from the effect of lead upon IQ, but from the confounder SES.
To tease out the smaller effect of lead after adjusting for the
substantial effect of SES, we must measure SES accurately and
precisely.
Adjusting for confounders is crucial, but we must adjust for all
the confounders, and measure them well.
2.

Other Strategies

It deserves mentioning that a variety of other techniques exist
for overcoming challenges to the prima facie case, none of which
will be described in any detail here. For example, economists, and
increasingly epidemiologists, use instrumental variable estimators
to overcome the possible bias from confounders.30 The advantage
of instrumental variable estimators is that they do not require
enumerating, measuring, and adjusting for all possible confounders.
They do, however, require a strong assumption concerning how the
instrumental variable relates to the possible confounders.
Instrumental variables are by no means a panacea.
In many cases temporal information and background or
theoretical knowledge can serve to eliminate alternative
explanations of the observed association. For example, in a 2004
study of terrorist attacks and their effect on Israeli psychology,

30

See Sander Greenland, An Introduction to Instrumental Variables for
Epidemiologists, 29(4) INT ’ L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 722, 722–29 (2000).
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Guy Stecklov and Joshua R. Goldstein31 make a prima facie case
by showing that there is an association between a terror attack and
suicides (as measured by fatal traffic accidents) three days later.32
By showing first that other types of minor accidents were
unassociated with terror attacks three days prior, Stecklov and
Goldstein eliminate a worry about random sampling error for traffic
accidents. 33 By eliminating on common sense any other plausible
factor that might cause both a terror attack and then higher traffic
fatalities three days later, the researchers eliminate the main
challenge to the prima facie case for causation.34
Finally, computer scientists, philosophers, and statisticians
have in the past few decades developed, and in now dozens of
instances successfully used, a technique called model search to
move beyond the prima facie case for causation.35 For example,
model search was used on a biological case involving the effect of
pollution on Spartina grass in the Cape Fear estuary. 36 Contrary to
the conclusions reached by biologists using multiple regression,
model search suggested that pH 37 (a clear side effect of several
suspected pollutants) was the only detectible cause of Spartina
grass biomass in the estuary. Later experiments in greenhouses
confirmed this conclusion.
Again, model search is no panacea. In theory, model search
does not locate a single causal hypothesis. It locates all the causal
hypotheses that are indistinguishable on the background knowledge
31

Guy Stecklov & Joshua R. Goldstein, Terror Attacks Influence Driving
Behavior in Israel, 101 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT ’ L ACAD. OF SCI. 14551,
14551–56 (2004).
32
Stecklov and Goldstein use fatal accidents as a measure of suicide rates
because of the unreliability of suicide data in Israel: “[B]ecause of religious
restrictions on the burial of suicide victims in Jewish cemeteries,” actual
suicides are almost never recorded as suicides in Israel. Id. at 14555.
33
Id. at 14554–55.
34
Id. at 14555.
35
See SPIRTES ET AL., supra note 5, at 196–98; BILL SHIPLEY, CAUSE
AND CORRELATION IN B IOLOGY : A USER’S GUIDE TO P ATH ANALYSIS,
STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE 21–63.
36
See SPIRTES ET AL ., supra note 5.
37
pH is a measure of the acidity or alkalinity of a solution.
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and data given. In many cases this is not sufficient to overcome the
challenges to the prima facie case.
IV. A SCIENTIFIC CHECKLIST FOR CAUSATION
In summary, evaluating the scientific case for causation can
follow the stages of making it:
1. Make a prima facie case:
a. establish an association between the putative cause
and the effect, as measured by an appropriate statistic,
e.g., Relative Risk, Odds Ratio, or Correlation
b. assess the statistical evidence for the association with
hypothesis tests (p-values), or confidence intervals
2. Consider challenges to the prima facie case, e.g.,
alternative explanations of the association.
a. Confounding: differences in the populations being
compared or factors affecting exposure to the cause and
the effect, e.g., income
b. Recall bias
3. Employ strategies to overcome these challenges.
a. Statistically Adjust for Confounders, e.g., multiple
regression
i. Have all confounders been measured?
ii. Have all confounders been measured well?
b. Instrumental Variable Estimation
c. Use temporal or background knowledge
d. Model search
4. Consider biological/mechanistic evidence.
a. Animal Studies
b. Cell Studies
c. Biological Mechanisms
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CONCLUSION
The overall case for causation depends upon making a prima
facie case and then dispatching the plausible challenges to it. The
confidence we put in certain components of this case, e.g.,
establishing an association to make the prima facie case, should
depend heavily on statistical methods. The confidence we put in
the overall case for causation, however, should depend as much on
scientific judgment and other forms of evidence as on statistics.
For example, in assessing the effect of exposure to
formaldehyde on leukemia and nasopharyngeal cancer, researchers
from the International Agency for Research on Cancer (“IARC”)
weighed the complete body of evidence for causation.38 In the case
of nasal cancer, early work on animals and on mechanisms by
which formaldehyde might cause nasal cancer favored causation,
but only after epidemiological evidence showed both a strong
prima facie connection as well as a good case for withstanding
challenges to the prima facie case did IARC conclude that
formaldehyde should be added to the group of agents that are
carcinogenic to humans.39 By contrast, in the case of leukemia,
epidemiological studies demonstrated a significant statistical
association between formaldehyde exposure and leukemia even
after adjusting for potential confounding, but IARC would not
classify the relation as causal because of mechanistic and biological
evidence showing that inhaled formaldehyde breaks down before it
reaches the bone marrow, and that only by being in the bone
marrow can it cause leukemia.40

38

Press Release, Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer, IAFD Classifies
Formaldehyde as Carcinogenic to Humans (June 15, 2004), available at
http://www.iarc.fr/ENG/Press_Releases/archives/pr153a.html (last visited Feb.
13, 2007).
39
Id.
40
W ORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR
RESEARCH ON CANCER (IARC), IARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF
CARCINOGENIC RISK TO HUMANS: PREAMBLE (2006), available at
http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Preamble/CurrentPreamble.pdf (last visited Nov.
27, 2007).
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In the toxic tort hypothetical involving QualChem 43, the
overall evidence is thin, and perhaps inconclusive, as to whether
there is a substantial effect in general or in the specific case of Mr.
Smith. Nevertheless, the evidence cannot be dismissed because it
lacks scientific validity. The biological evidence from rats appears
scientifically sound, is relevant to the onset of liver cancer, and
shows an effect, even if only at relatively high doses. Translating
dose equivalents between rats and humans is problematic, but the
practice is based on much more than speculation.
The epidemiological evidence makes a reasonable prima facie
case for causation by showing an association between QualChem
43 exposure and liver cancer. That the association (an odds ratio of
3.2) is “not significant” at .05 is a red herring based entirely on the
.05 convention. The association is significant at under .10, thereby
indicating that there is under a 10% chance that the observed
association is purely due to random chance. The remaining
challenges to the prima facie case are recall bias and confounding.
Although Ellen Epidemiologist testifies that recall bias should be
negligible, it would nice to know the justification for that belief. As
to confounding, the case control study matched populations for
age, gender, and occupation. Occupation is part of socioeconomic
status, and it is certainly plausible that the adjusted association
removes significant sources of confounding. Therefore, there is
evidence for causation.
Overall, the case for causation may be far from conclusive, but
it is based on both biological and epidemiological evidence, both of
which suggest that QualChem 43 causes liver cancer. Whether or
not Mr. Smith’s particular case of liver cancer was caused by his
exposure to QualChem 43 is another question altogether, and
depends on his level of exposure and other risk factors that might
have affected him. Dr. Epidemiologist does testify that, after ruling
out other risk factors like alcohol or hepatitis B, it is her scientific
opinion that his liver cancer was caused by QualChem 43. Whether
or not one agrees with her, her opinion is clearly based on
reasonable science. The evidence upon which her conclusion is
based is not conclusive, but it is undoubtedly scientific.
In the scientific literature on the effects of low-level lead
exposure on children, few deny that there is a statistical association
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between lead exposure and low IQ, even after adjusting for
measures of potential confounders.41 The issue to the scientists,
however, is whether the potential confounders have been measured
accurately enough to guard against a bias in the adjusted statistical
estimate of association.42 That is, the challenge of potential
confounding is difficult to overcome because of the difficulty of
measuring the potential confounders precisely and accurately.
Thus, for judges handling a case involving causation, especially
one subject to Daubert,43 or for attorneys who must make or
challenge a case to a jury, the overall scientific evidence for
causation involves statistics but also involves much more.
The questions to ask of the literature and of experts who might
testify in court are:
1. Is there a prima facie case? That is, is there statistical
association between the purported cause and the effect?
2. What are the challenges to the prima facie case? That is,
what other explanations of the association besides causation
are plausible?
3. What evidence is there to overcome challenges to the
prima facie case? That is, what statistical evidence do we
have about adjusted associations, and what assumptions
must we adopt in order to have confidence in this statistical

41

See Steven Fienberg, Clark Glymour, & Richard Scheines, Expert
Statistical Testimony and Epidemiological Evidence: the Toxic Effects of Lead
Exposure on Children, J. ECONOMETRICS 33–48 (2002); Laurentius Marais &
William, Correcting for Omitted-Variables and Measure-Error Bias in
Regression With an Application to the Effect of Lead on IQ, 93 JASA 442,
494–505 (1998).
42
See Steven Fienberg, Clark Glymour, & Richard Scheines, supra note
40; Richard Scheines, Estimating Latent Causal Influences: TETRAD III
Variable Selection and Bayesian Parameter Estimation: the Effect of Lead on
IQ,
in H ANDBOOK OF DATA MINING (2001), available at
http://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/scheines/leadiq.pdf; Laurentius Marais &
William Wecker, Correcting for Omitted-Variables and Measure-Error Bias in
Regression With an Application to the Effect of Lead on IQ, 93 J. AM. STAT .
ASS’ N 494, 494–505 (1998).
43
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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evidence? Further, how sensitive are the results to these
assumptions?

4. What does biological, toxicological, mechanistic, and/or
animal study evidence show?
In many, many cases, the scientific evidence for general or
specific causation is neither conclusive nor compelling.44
Regardless, we do not want to prevent expert testimony on
evidence which falls short of some degree of certainty, but rather,
we want to prevent testimony on evidence which is unscientific.

44

See, e.g., Glastetter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, (8th Cir.
2001) (excluding plaintiff’s expert evidence and determining insufficient evidence
of causation); Globetti v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D.
Ala. 2000) (admitting plaintiff’s expert evidence for causation).
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ATTACHMENT TO CAUSATION, STATISTICS,
AND THE LAW BY RICHARD SCHEINES
TOXIC TORT HYPOTHETICAL*
Mrs. Wynona Smith, a resident of Faulkner, Mississippi, filed
this diversity action, as Administratrix of her husband’s estate,
against QualChem Manufacturing Co. for wrongful death and
personal injuries. The claim results from Mr. Smith’s exposure to
QualChem 43, a chemical released into the Blue River by
QualChem Manufacturing Co. as a by-product of its manufacturing
operations. Recovery is sought on theories of negligence, strict
liability for ultrahazardous activities, private nuisance, and
trespass. The complaint alleges that the amount in controversy
exceeds $50,000 exclusive of interest and costs.
The complaint states that Mr. Smith contracted liver cancer and
died as a result of this cancer, caused by exposure to QualChem 43.
Mrs. Smith alleges that her husband was exposed to QualChem 43
in the drinking water of the family home, located on the banks of
the Blue River. Mrs. Smith and her husband resided on the banks
of the Blue River for 45 years. Mr. Smith died 12 months ago after
a four year battle with cancer. The family drinking water is drawn
from a well on their property adjacent to the river.
In its answer, QualChem Manufacturing Co. admits that it
began manufacturing operations in Tennessee 85 years ago. The
plant is five miles from the state line of Mississippi and 10 miles
upriver from plaintiff’s property. The answer alleges that
QualChem 43 is a by-product of its manufacturing process and that
small amounts of QualChem 43 have been discharged into the Blue

* This hypothetical, which was originally developed by Professor Margaret
A. Berger of Brooklyn Law School and Professor Diane L. Zimmerman of New
York University School of Law, has been revised by the Federal Judicial Center.
We thank the FJC for making it available for the Science for Judges program and
for publication.
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River for many years. The answer denies that Mr. Smith’s liver
cancer was caused by QualChem 43.
As a result of admissions obtained during discovery, the parties
do not dispute that as a result of flooding that occurs in Faulkner,
wells on riverfront property are contaminated with QualChem 43
at a level of approximately 40 micrograms per liter. That level of
contamination has been stable over the past 85 years, since
QualChem Manufacturing Co. began its operations in Tennessee.
In addition, fish in the Blue River have been found to contain
QualChem 43, at a level varying from 20 to 100 micrograms per
kilogram of body weight. The contamination of the Blue River and
its fish with QualChem 43 has been highly publicized in Faulkner
and other communities in the vicinity of the river for at least a
decade. No other source of QualChem 43 contamination of the Blue
River is known.
Following expert discovery, defendant moved to have all of
plaintiff’s expert witnesses’ testimony declared inadmissible
because it lacks scientific validity, and filed a motion for summary
judgment, claiming that no genuine issue of material fact exists with
regard to the question of QualChem 43 causing Mr. Smith’s cancer.
Defendant’s motion was supported by affidavits deemed adequate
by the court. The court ordered an evidentiary hearing at which
plaintiff’s two expert witnesses, Dr. Teresa Toxicologist and Dr.
Ellen Epidemiologist, testified on the causation issue. A summary
of the testimony of each of the three witnesses at the hearing
follows.
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PLAINTIFF’S FIRST WITNESS - DR. ELLEN
EPIDEMIOLOGIST
Mrs. Smith’s first expert witness is Dr. Ellen Epidemiologist
who has degrees in epidemiology and medicine. The court has
determined that this witness is qualified to testify as an
epidemiologist and as a physician.
On direct examination, the witness testifies that there is one
epidemiological study of the effects of QualChem 43 on humans, a
case-control study. The study was performed recently, has been
submitted to an epidemiological journal for publication, and is
currently undergoing peer review as part of the submission
process. She testifies that the study was conducted because of
anecdotal reports of an increased incidence of cancer, particularly
liver cancer, among residents living near the river in and around
Faulkner.
The study was conducted by epidemiologists employed by the
Mississippi Department of Public Health. In the study, the
epidemiologists identified individuals with liver cancer from a state
solid tumor registry. Controls were matched for age, gender, and
occupation and obtained from a state registry of organ donors.
None of the controls had liver cancer.
Both cases and controls were personally interviewed and their
medical records obtained. A variety of factors were assessed,
including other known causes of liver cancer, which include
alcoholism and hepatitis B virus. Cases and controls were asked
about the source of their drinking water, and unless the initial
answer clearly included or excluded drinking water from the Blue
River, the interviewer asked specifically about whether the subject
drank water from the Blue River. Unless the subject obtained
virtually all of his or her water from the Blue River or a well
situated close to it, the individual was treated as unexposed.
Among the cases, 9 were classified as exposed to Blue River
water (and therefore QualChem 43) and 3 were unexposed. In the
control group, 44 were exposed to Blue River water and 44 were
not. Using standard statistical methodology, Dr. Epidemiologist
testifies that the odds ratio for the association between exposure to
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Blue River water and liver cancer is 3.2. A nested confidence
interval, representing two different statistical significance levels
was constructed by the authors of the study and is displayed
below.
EXHIBIT A
ODDS RATIO

_<—————— .90 CI
_<——————— .95 CI

—————————————————>_
———————————————————>_
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Based on the association between liver cancer and exposure to
QualChem 43 in drinking water found in this study, Dr.
Epidemiologist testifies that QualChem 43 causes liver cancers in
humans.
On cross-examination, about the epidemiological study and its
implications, Dr. Epidemiologist concedes that:
The study suffered from the possibility of recall bias, in that
those with liver cancer were more likely to recall having been
exposed to Blue River water than those who did not have liver
cancer. Nevertheless, Dr. Epidemiologist stated that she believed
any bias that existed would only have a negligible effect on the
outcome.
While cases and controls were treated as wholly exposed or
unexposed, some of the participants treated as unexposed may
have been partially exposed to QualChem 43 at work, while
visiting friends or relatives, or in other situations.
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The association between liver cancer and exposure to
QualChem 43 found in the study is not statistically significant at
the .05 level; the lower boundary of the .95 confidence interval
includes the odds ratio value of 1.0. However, Dr. Epidemiologist
testifies that the association is statistically significant at the .10
level, because the lower boundary of the .90 confidence interval
does not include an odds ratio of 1.0.
The authors of the epidemiological study stated in the study
that their conclusion was that the study was suggestive that
QualChem 43 caused liver cancer but that further research was
required before QualChem 43’s carcinogenicity could be considered
proven.
On further direct examination, Dr. Epidemiologist testifies that
she reviewed Mr. Smith’s medical records and interviewed his
widow. She testifies that Mr. Smith died of liver cancer.
Dr. Epidemiologist determined that Mr. Smith had been
exposed to QualChem 43 by inquiring of plaintiff about her
husband’s drinking water and consumption of fish. Dr.
Epidemiologist learned from her that her husband did catch and eat
fish from the river approximately twice a week for most of his
adult life. When at home, decedent drank water that was drawn
from the well on the property. Based on this information, Dr.
Epidemiologist concluded Mr. Smith was exposed to QualChem
43.
In addition, Dr. Epidemiologist determined the other known
causes of liver cancer. While roughly 50 percent of liver cancers are
due to unknown causes, Dr. Epidemiologist ascertained that two
known causes of liver cancer are alcoholism and the hepatitis B
virus. Based on Mr. Smith’s medical records and the interview with
plaintiff, Dr. Epidemiologist was able to rule out both of these risk
factors. Based on the toxicological and epidemiological evidence,
Mr. Smith’s exposure to QualChem 43, and ruling out alcoholism
and hepatitis B as possible causes of Mr. Smith’s cancer, Dr.
Epidemiologist concluded that Mr. Smith’s liver cancer was caused
by exposure to QualChem 43 to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty.
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PLAINTIFF’S SECOND WITNESS - DR.
TERESA TOXICOLOGIST
Mrs. Smith’s second witness is Dr. Teresa Toxicologist. The
court reviewed Dr. Toxicologist’s curriculum vitae and determined
that she is qualified to testify. Dr. Toxicologist has identified two
published studies on the carcinogenic effects of QualChem 43 on
animals.
Exhibit B (attached) shows the results of a published study
conducted on mice. The study consisted of two groups, one group
of mice was exposed to QualChem 43 in its drinking water, and one
group was not exposed to QualChem 43 in its drinking water.
Both groups were given 5 milliliters of water per kilogram of body
weight on a daily basis. The exposed group’s water contained 5
milligrams of QualChem 43 per liter of water. Among the exposed
mice, 14 out of 92 developed liver cancer for an incidence of .15,
and among the unexposed mice, 2 out of 85 developed liver cancer,
for an incidence of .02. Thus, those mice that were exposed to
QualChem 43 had approximately seven times the rate of liver
cancer as the unexposed mice. Dr. Toxicologist testifies that the
difference in the rate of liver cancer in the two groups is
statistically significant at the .05 level. She also testifies that the
dose of QualChem 43 to which the mice were exposed is
approximately 125 times the dose humans would receive over a
lifetime if their drinking water contained 40 micrograms per liter of
QualChem 43 (approximately the dose to which Mr. Smith was
exposed).
Exhibit C (attached) shows the results of a published study
conducted on Sprague Dawley rats. This study was conducted
using three separate groups of exposed rats and a group of
unexposed rats. The three exposed groups of rats were subjected to
a low dose of QualChem 43 (80 micrograms of QualChem 43 per
liter of water), a medium dose (500 micrograms of QualChem 43
per liter of water), and a high dose (25 milligrams of QualChem 43
per liter of water). Dr. Toxicologist explains that these dosages
roughly conform to a lifetime exposure in humans of two times, 10
times, and 500 times, respectively, the dose to which Mr. Smith
was exposed.
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Among the unexposed group of rodents, 4 out of 200
developed kidney cancer, an incidence of .02. In the low dose
group, 3 out of 170 developed kidney cancer, an incidence of .018.
In the medium exposed group, 16 out of 194 rats developed kidney
cancer, an incidence of .08, and in the high dose group, 44 out of
210 developed kidney cancer, an incidence of .21. The difference in
incidence between the control group and the low exposure cohort
was not statistically significant (p > .5), the differences between
each of the medium and high dose groups and the control group
were both statistically significant at the .05 level. Exhibit C
(attached) contains a dose-response curve that reflects the
incidence of cancer based on the dose to which each group of
rodents was exposed. Because researchers believe that both liver
and kidney cancer are initiated by perturbations in cell
differentiation, Dr. Toxicologist believes that the results of this
study are relevant to the question of whether QualChem 43 causes
liver cancer.
Based on these two studies, Dr. Toxicologist testifies that in
her opinion QualChem 43 is clearly carcinogenic in two different
species of rodents and that it is likely to be carcinogenic in the
human species.
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EXHIBIT B
SUMMARY OF MOUSE DATA
UNEXPOSED GROUP
# with

# in

Liver Cancer

Group

2

85

EXPOSED GROUP

Incidence
.02

# with

# in

Liver Cancer

Group

14

Incidence

92

.15

EXHIBIT C
SUMMARY OF RAT DATA

UNEXPOSED GROUP

LOW EXPOSED GROUP

# with

# in

Kidney Cancer

Group Incidence

4

200

# with

.02

MEDIUM EXPOSED GROUP
# with
Kidney Cancer
16

# in
Group
194

Kidney Cancer
3

.08

Group Incidence
170

.018

HIGH EXPOSED GROUP
# with

Incidence

# in

Kidney Cancer
44

# in
Group Incidence
210

.21

